When Secrecy Becomes a Crime: Why the Freemasons Ruling Should Worry Us All

This week, the courts decided it is acceptable for the state to know who you meet, what societies you join, and what associations you keep. The Freemasons might be the headline, but the lesson is universal, privacy is under siege and liberty is negotiable. When secrecy becomes suspect and lawful association becomes a matter for government scrutiny, we cross a line that no citizen should accept lightly.

The High Court in London dismissed the Freemasons’ legal challenge against a Metropolitan Police policy requiring officers and staff to declare whether they are, or have ever been, members of Freemasonry or similar secretive organisations. The policy was defended in court as a necessary step to preserve public trust in policing. The judge concluded that it was proportionate and reasonable in order to avoid perceived or actual bias in law enforcement.

On the surface, this appears to be an internal administrative matter, however, a closer look reveals a far more profound shift in the balance between individual liberty and state authority. The court prioritised trust over personal freedom and, in doing so, signalled a troubling expansion of state oversight into private life.

Police officers are not ordinary citizens, they hold extraordinary power over the lives of others and are entrusted with enforcing the law impartially. Their decisions can profoundly affect justice, liberty, and social order. This context gives rise to a legitimate argument that officers carry a special responsibility to disclose associations that might create the appearance of conflict. It should be noted that police themselves often see their service as an association in which they look after one another, sometimes in a way that could seem preferential. This culture of mutual support is an important part of policing, but it also complicates the question of loyalty and influence when officers belong to closed societies that require confidentiality. Transparency about certain affiliations can help preserve impartiality and maintain public confidence but the ethical principle here is not intrusion for intrusion’s sake but a measured trade-off. Officers accept limits on privacy to safeguard the collective security they are sworn to protect.

The ruling, however, overreaches. It treats all private association as potentially suspect, rather than targeting evidence of actual conflicts or misconduct. Liberal philosophy teaches that interference with private life is justified only to prevent harm to others. John Stuart Mill’s principle reminds us that personal liberty should be curtailed only where actions directly harm someone else. Declaring membership in a society like the Freemasons does not in itself constitute wrongdoing, it is lawful and historically widespread, indeed Freemasonry imposes obligations on its members to obey the law of the land. By demanding disclosure without evidence of harm, the policy treats privacy as conditional and suspicion as default. This sets a precedent in which secrecy itself becomes a presumed threat.

The decision is damaging not only because it infringes on the Freemasons’ right to privacy but because it establishes a broader principle. Any citizen’s lawful, private associations may now be subject to scrutiny simply to satisfy perceptions of trust. This is a step toward normalising surveillance under the guise of security. Police officers may have additional duties, but the obligation to disclose must remain proportionate, narrowly defined, and based on clear evidence of risk. Otherwise, personal freedom is subordinated to vague notions of trust.

Philosophically, the case exposes a tension between the state’s legitimate role in safeguarding collective security and the individual’s right to autonomy. Police officers, by virtue of their duties, may accept certain constraints. Those constraints must always be carefully justified and proportionate. Routine demands for disclosure, justified by the mere possibility of perceived bias, erode civil liberty and threaten the foundation of a free society.

The court has chosen convenience over principle and validated a policy that treats secrecy as a liability. Transparency in policing is important, but it should never come at the expense of lawful privacy. If the state can demand knowledge of our associations simply because they are confidential, no corner of private life is secure. The ruling is not just a setback for the Freemasons; it is a warning to all of us. Liberty is fragile, and the freedoms we take for granted can be eroded quietly, step by step. The question is not whether officers should disclose affiliations, but whether any of us should fear that our private, lawful choices might one day be scrutinised, judged, or constrained. That is the line we must not allow to be crossed.